On September 14, Macau held the 8th Legal Setting up political election given that its return, choosing 14 directly elected seats out of 33 in the assembly. The results were revealed: the pro-Beijing establishment camp won 73 3 % of the ballot and secured 11 of the 14 seats, while the pro-democracy camp’s “New Hope” won the remaining 3 seats.
This election preserved roughly the previous 7: 3 proportion in between the establishment and pro-democracy camps. Yet this election occurred under a dramatically moving political environment in Macau– affected by the extreme political adjustments next door in Hong Kong, the substantial modification and tightening up of the “Macau National Safety Legislation,” Beijing and the Macau federal government’s solid focus on “patriots controling Macau,” the incompetency (“DQ”) of multiple pro-democracy and centrist candidates prior to the election, and the strong support provided to the facility camp. Under such numerous pressures, the pro-democracy camp still amassed around 30 % of the vote, and the pro-democracy celebration “New Hope” even became the solitary celebration with the highest ballot share. This showed the tug-of-war in between Macau’s public opinion and political power, as well as the truth that the people of Macau hold varied political placements.
Unlike Hong Kong, which has long been caught in a vortex of political conflict because its return, Macau has actually continued to be reasonably tranquil politically and socially. Macau is much smaller sized in region and population than Hong Kong, lower-profile, and less in the limelight. Even before the return, Macau’s elites and lots of citizens were relatively close to the Chinese government.
However, as a highly self-governing Unique Management Region, Macau has constantly had pro-democracy pressures unique from the facility. Teams such as the “Civic Organization,” the “New Macau Association,” and in this election the well-voted “New Hope,” are all pro-democracy companies. Compared with the facility camp, which prides itself on being “patriotic” and “pro-Macau,” follows Beijing unquestioningly, and tends to take a pro-business, elitist position, these pro-democracy groups emphasize issues of flexibility and freedom in Macau and concentrate more on the livelihood of the middle and lower classes, typically slamming the government. But compared to Hong Kong, Macau’s democrats are extra moderate and low-profile, focusing on livelihood concerns over politically sensitive ones.
For Beijing and the Macau government, meeting the “One Nation, Two Systems” assurance, incorporated with the overwhelming prominence of the facility camp, suggested there was little concern of democrats seizing power. Because of this, the existence of pro-democracy groups was endured. Still, they dealt with several limitations: most Legislative Assembly seats are not straight chosen but rather chosen by practical constituencies or designated by the Chief Executive– often mosting likely to establishment figures. Pro-democracy road tasks and fundraising are greatly limited. On the other hand, facility teams not just encounter no barriers yet enjoy adequate resources and plan favoritism. From 1999 to 2019, despite such restraints, Macau’s democrats handled to exist side-by-side with the facility in an implied concession.
Given that 2019, however, as a result of Hong Kong’s political upheaval and changes in mainland China’s political environment, Beijing has actually strengthened its control over Macau, and the Macau government has become significantly intolerant of pro-democracy forces.
Both the central and Macau governments have made the concept of “patriots governing Macau” specific, stressing that Macau homeowners must “enjoy the nation and love Macau.” In method, this suggests that authorities, legislators, and political figures have to reveal absolute commitment to Beijing and high conformity with the Macau government’s policies. People once treated as “united front targets” amongst the democrats or centrists, and even facility participants who articulated some dissent, have actually dealt with judicial instances and procedural challenges to block their candidateship or political involvement.
In the 2021 seventh Legal Assembly political election, nationwide security companies introduced pre-screening of prospects. A total amount of 21 candidates were invalidated on grounds of “not supporting the Macau Basic Law or not pledging allegiance to the Macau SAR of the People’s Republic of China.” This triggered voter turnout to drop and minimized the democrats’ seats from four to 2.
In this year’s election, the “DQ” criteria were also more stringent and wider. In addition to the 21 blacklisted in 2021, another 12 were barred, including centrist incumbent legislator Lam U Tou. Veteran democrat Au Kam San was apprehended under national protection fees, while one more appreciated labor leader, Wong Wai Man, was detained briefly before enrollment, creating him to miss out on the due date. The pro-democracy camp likewise had little possibility to project in conventional media. In contrast, pro-Beijing facility figures received solid support, plentiful election resources, and positive media insurance coverage. The government even presented free public transportation on political election day to enhance turnout and reinforce the facility’s authenticity.
Yet despite such a background, the single pro-democracy party enabled to contest, “New Hope,” alone caught almost 30 % of the popular ballot. Expert democrat José Pereira Coutinho (Gao Tian Ci) ended up being the top vote-winner. Ballots from disqualified pro-democracy parties and prospects greatly flowed to “New Hope” instead of changing to the establishment or abstention. On the other hand, establishment parties– in spite of their desirable conditions– won just over 70 % of the enact total, essentially the same from the previous political election (slightly down, as a matter of fact).
This outcome reflects that part of Macau’s citizens reject the policies executed in the name of “patriots regulating Macau,” wonder about the establishment’s monopoly over national politics, and reveal dissent and civic disobedience via their ballots.
Although Macau has long appeared calm and its people hardly ever test the central government’s sovereignty and control, this does not suggest they agree to surrender flexibility and democracy or move toward “One Country, One System.” On the contrary, lots of people in Macau deeply treasure their restricted yet priceless freedoms and expect better freedom and pluralism, making it possible for genuine prominent engagement and checks and balances.
In both pre- and post-handover Macau, people’s living setting and education and learning differed from landmass China. Macau citizens often tend to believe and judge even more separately, reveal more freedom and less blind obedience, remain cautious of power, and highly worth civil liberties. Below their silent attitude lies dignity and steadfastness.
Therefore, despite the fact that current years have seen sharp political changes, tighter controls, and lowered liberties, and despite the fact that Beijing and the Macau federal government have actually punished the resistance while supporting the facility, some Macau residents have continued to hold strongly to their political positions and voting choices. Contrasted to the 2017 and earlier elections, despite the extremely negative atmosphere for democrats in the last two terms, their ballot share has not significantly decreased, consistently maintaining around 30 %. This shows that democratic supporters in Macau have not deserted their concepts when faced with political turmoil, showing noteworthy strength.
Such election results and social realities need to prompt reflection from Beijing, the Macau government, and the establishment camp, and cause changes in how Macau is regulated. Any government, no matter its original purposes, must understand that public sentiment is vital and beneficial. Disregarding or reducing it, and leaving out dissent, is not the way ahead.
As the old claiming goes, “The people are the structure of a country; when the foundation is strong, the country will be protected.” For Macau to attain long-term stability and avoid chaos, it must pay attention to people’s resources concerns, regard popular opinion, and genuinely uphold the structure of “One Nation, 2 Systems.” This indicates enabling the conjunction of both establishment and autonomous pressures, guaranteeing shared oversight, and keeping a varied political presence and plurality of voices in Macau society.